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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV
IN R. v. Dica [2004] 3 W.L.R. 213, the Court of Appeal decided
that a man who knows that he is infected with the HIV virus but
who infects his unsuspecting sexual partner through unprotected
sexual intercourse should be punishable for inﬂicting grievous
bodily harm, contrary to section 20 of the Oﬀences Against the
Person Act 1861. The Court did in fact quash the conviction of the
accused, because the judge at the Old Bailey had not instructed the
jury to decide whether or not the two infected partners of the
accused had known of his infection and agreed to take the risk of
contracting it themselves (this having been in dispute at the trial).
Yet the case was sent for retrial, and if the next jury, properly
directed, should ﬁnd that his partners did not agree to take the risk
of contracting the potentially fatal virus, then Dica would be
properly convicted under OAPA, section 20.
Two important points of principle were decided in the Court of
Appeal. First, if a person does consent to the risk of contracting
HIV through sexual intercourse (through love of an infected
partner, perhaps, or through a conscientious objection to using
contraceptives) then no oﬀence is committed by the carrier if the
disease is transmitted. The trial judge, following R. v. Brown [1993]
2 All E.R. 75, had thought otherwise, and that is why (believing
that there could be no defence based upon consent) he had
(wrongly) instructed the jury that it did not need to decide whether
Dica’s victims had consented. But the cases are properly
distinguishable. In Brown, sexual gratiﬁcation was achieved through
the harm itself—that is, pleasure was sought only through the pain
of another; whereas the parties who have sexual intercourse will be
seeking their gratiﬁcation through the intercourse itself and will be
hoping fervently that the harm potentially caused by the virus will
not occur. It is not clear, however, whether this part of the decision
in Dica should be interpreted to be (a) that the need to ﬁnd a
‘‘good reason’’ (as ﬁrst required in Attorney-General’s Reference
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(No.6 of 1980) [1981] Q.B. 715, 719 (CA) and conﬁrmed by the
House of Lords in Brown) for consented-to activity only applies to
cases where the bodily harm is intended by the defendant, and that
there need not be any good reason at all for taking a consented-to
risk of causing serious harm, or (b) that there still needs to be a
‘‘good reason’’ for the activity even where the doer does not wish
to cause bodily harm but is aware of the risk that he might do so,
but it is now much easier to ﬁnd that good reason, and the pursuit
of sexual gratiﬁcation might normally qualify.
The second important point of principle in Dica is that consent
to sexual intercourse is not to be equated with consent to the risk of
contracting HIV through sex. The latter is more diﬃcult to establish
because it depends upon an assessment of risks of possible
consequences. To put it in another way: consent to sexual
intercourse requires only a general understanding of sex; and so,
provided that a woman understands that all sexual intercourse
carries an inherent risk of pregnancy and disease, rape is not
committed. But to consent to the risk of bodily harm requires a
more nuanced understanding of the nature of the risk involved, and
here ignorance of a fact which aﬀects the risk from a particular act
of congress (such as the fact that the man suﬀers from HIV) might
negate the consent of the other. Now, almost every person who
agrees to unprotected sexual intercourse surely knows that there is
always, statistically, some risk of contracting HIV. Someone may
unknowingly carry it without showing symptoms. A careful person
might yet choose to take that risk, for it is much smaller than the
risk of contracting the disease from some one who is known to be
carrying it. The diﬀerence is so great that we might say that
consent to the small risk is not at all consent to the much larger
risk. That may have been the case in Dica: thus the retrial. But
where the victim has information about her partner which would
put him in a high risk category, then a jury will need to decide
whether she consented to a risk of contracting the virus which was
suﬃciently close to the real risk. Exactly how close the victim’s
estimate of the risk of contracting HIV must be to the actual risk
in order for her consent to be valid is a thorny question. If the
(true) risk of transmission also varies between individuals, then
clearly some diﬃcult cases await us.
In fact, punishing the transmission of HIV will always be a
perilous aﬀair in practice, perhaps even more diﬃcult than securing
convictions for rape. First, there is the question of causation: to
show that the victim contracted the virus from the defendant might
lead to the sort of cross-examination of the victim’s sexual habits
which used to deter so many women from reporting rape. There
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will be separate problems where the HIV carrier did not know of
his infection (i.e., if he had not been tested). Though he should still
in law be reckless as to causing harm if he suspected that he had
the virus, it will be surely much harder to prove beyond doubt a
mere suspicion. Then a defence of consent to the risk of
transmission may be run, with the diﬃculties outlined above. If
that is not enough, the defendant may seek to avoid liability by
claiming that he believed that his partner consented to the risk; and
at common law, a mistaken belief would not need to be reasonably
grounded. Here, the problems caused by mixed signals in sexual
matters between men and women in rape cases might be magniﬁed:
perhaps a man will claim that by having alluded vaguely to
‘‘having had a bit of past’’, he thought that he made it clear that
he had had a number of unprotected encounters, and that his
partner thus gave consent to something like the true nature of the
risk of contracting HIV from him.
One might well think these points (and others) militate against
the creation of criminal liability in Dica. Professor A.T.H. Smith
has cogently argued that the Court of Appeal may have violated all
the established principles in determining whether judicial (as
opposed to legislative) extension of the criminal law might be
proper ([2004] Crim. L.R. at 977). The objection that the decision
brings about obscurity rather than ﬁnality is correct; for example,
what will be the eﬀect upon recklessness, consent and belief in
consent to the risk of communicating HIV where a condom is
used? But if the worst of the problems in prosecuting HIV carriers
for transmission are likely to be practical (as outlined above) rather
than purely legal, then the argument is not forceful by itself—
legislation would not obviously be much more eﬀective than
judicial ﬁat in addressing these practical problems. It is also true
that Parliament has avoided opportunities of addressing the liability
of the HIV carrier. But the reality is that governments, and not
Parliaments, decide which legislation is to be debated, and
sometimes a government refrains from confronting a problem
through sheer political cowardice. Perhaps the principle ought to be
that the courts should refrain from making new law only whilst the
government of the day is already taking active consultative
measures towards revising it, or has promised to do so? In that
case, we might welcome Dica for allowing the punishment of the
undoubtedly culpable and selﬁsh carrier but only on the condition
that, in view of the myriad diﬃculties in prosecuting such cases, it
is likely to be only clear-cut cases (where the man knows that he
has the disease and goes so far as to hide all signs of it from his
partner) which will be pursued. It is not a perfect solution. There is
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still the risk of private prosecutions, and it is not obviously proper
to wish to restrict that right simply because the substantive criminal
law may be wider than it needs to be. But the record of British
governments in taking prompt action in clearing up controversial
points of criminal law is so dire (how long did we wait for the
Abortion Act 1967, and where is the legislation on euthanasia?)
that waiting for Parliament is no solution at all.
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